President: Jeff McCulloch – (027) 271 5325 V. President: John Geboers (021) 170 8405 Secretary: Boyd Raines – 021 899 108 Committee:Kevin BarbaraJason CameronMatt CamplinBrett GoodhueToby Kerr

John Waldow **Firefighter Reps:**

Carl Findlay James Hall

Officer Reps:

Wayne Bridger Sulu Devoe

AUCKLAND LOCAL

Correspondence to: The Secretary, P O Box 303-235 North Harbour, Auckland.

12 September 2008 Ref: ALC- 142

NOTICE TO AUCKLAND LOCAL MEMBERS

Operations Review Kahika Road Beachhaven 24 May 2008

Members may have read the drastically altered Operations Review put out by the Auckland Regional Manager in his Region Notice 69/2008.

The version issued bears very little resemblance to the original version drafted by the Review Team, as a large number of very important points made by the team have been either altered or omitted from the final report.

The Auckland Local believes that the sponsor of a review has the right not to accept some of the findings of a Review Team, and to show this in the corrective action plan, but does not have the right to alter the document so that it bears little or no resemblance to the original, to suit his or her own agenda.

Members will find attached the changes to the original document, which has completely altered the intention of the Review Team's findings. It will become obvious to members that some of the main recommendations of the review have been deliberately omitted, as they do not suit the outcomes required by the Region regarding volunteer responses.

The major changes to this Review Document, forced by the Auckland Regional Manager, have caused the Union members of the team much concern and have given the Auckland Local Committee cause to doubt the genuine desire of the Regional Management to actually improve the efficiency of the Brigade and improve the safety of the firefighters who respond to the emergencies within the Auckland Fire Region.

Jeff McCulloch President

<u>Variations between original Operations Review and censored version supplied by Auckland Regional Management.</u>

Original text in bold italics.

Regional Commander's variation in standard font.

Page 2.

Issues identified for comment include.

- Review of communications centre beat lists
- Composite pumps be backed up for all 2 pump calls and all alarm levels without the mandatory minimum 4-minute delay occurring

FRM Butt's variation.

Issues identified for comment include.

- The need for identification of areas of specific risk within existing response zones.
- · Review of composite station back up rules
- The importance of monitoring water supply on the fire ground and considering the establishment of a water supply officer
- Re-enforce the importance of exposure times in these heated environments

Page 8, last paragraph.

...time and distance are taken into consideration when comparisons are necessary. And also to include an additional SSO on the third alarm response.

FRM Butt's variation.

...time and distance are taken into consideration when comparisons are necessary.

(Note -reference to SSO removed).

Page 9 (page 11 in original)

The Beat list ...requires the response of GREE841 and EAST832 on a third alarm Structure fire. These appliances are recommended ahead of appliances that are immediately available and it is known that they would have an earlier arrival time. (Auckland 207 arrived 5 minutes before Bays 832 and 12 minutes before Greenhithe 841. Both were responded 1 minute earlier than Auckland 207).

FRM Butt's variation.

The actions of Comcentre staff during this incident highlighted inaccuracies within our turnout zones. There are areas within some response zones that require specialized response as a result of the risk they pose. This is shown in Appendix A (Figure 1) where this response zone is a combination of both industrial and residential. The standard response string to the residential areas is not necessarily the appropriate response to the commercial or industrial areas.

Set out below is the beat list (pumping and aerial appliances only) for this zone. The first aerial appliance response for this building was from the third alarm.

Page 10

The relevant policies that relate to the role of the Comcen are:

Policy	Followed	Effective and outcome
Mobilisation – Volunteer Response Operational Procedure No. 2 – Part 2	No	This policy is unable to be followed to any extent by any comcentre staff. It is cumbersome, confusing and unworkable. There is as many interpretations of this policy as there are staff on duty. The actions of the comcentre on the day, although not following the policy were very effective and had an excellent outcome on the incident.
Incident Resource Deployment Management requirements - Statement of Service Performance (SSP)	Yes	Policy allows for increasing the turnout to a confirmed incident or an escalating situation. The outcome was that an enhanced response was sent achieving an earlier arrival of the first responding aerial appliance.
Comcentre Manual – Mobilising Procedures (E3)	No	Had the comcentre followed this, the effect would have been detrimental to the successful response and AUCK207 would have been delayed by 4 to 6 minutes. The outcome was a more effective response by responding the additional pump immediately and not delaying the response by the mandatory 4 minutes.
Qualified Firefighter Program - Radio Operation (Location and Role of the Comcen) – Stage One Study Guide	Yes	The guide confirms that the Comcentre remains in command of an incident until the first appliance arrives. Comcentre actions lead to an excellent outcome.

FRM Butt's variation.

The relevant policies that relate to the role of the Comcen are:

Policy	Followed	Effective and outcome
Mobilisation – Volunteer Response Operational Procedure No. 2 – Part 2	No	The comcentre on the day did not follow the policy – there was no detrimental effect.
Incident Resource Deployment Management requirements - Statement of Service Performance (SSP)	Yes	This policy allows for increasing the turnout to a confirmed incident or an escalating situation.
Comcentre Manual – Mobilising Procedures (E3)	No	The comcentre on the day did not follow this policy. There was no detrimental affect resulting from the actions of the comcentre staff.

Page 16 (page 14 in original)

5) Incident Communications

It needs to be acknowledged that although some polices were not followed this had no detrimental effect on the incident. If on the other hand, comcentre staff were to follow them even in the most liberal way, significant and unreasonable delays would have occurred. Therefore, the recommendations set out below address the situation whereby staff are knowingly and continually breeching Fire Service policy.

5.1 Recommendation

That the existing communications centre beat lists be reviewed so as to ensure the early response of appliances which are immediately available.

As part of beat list review, the necessity for the second pump at composite stations to respond outside of the stations first pump area should be reviewed.

5.2 Recommendation

The existing composite station backup rules built into I/CAD automate the backup of composite pumps for structure fire calls only, in the stations first pump area and only on first alarm level. I/CAD does not backup these appliances for the following types of incident, but introduces a mandatory 4-minute minimum delay:

- Rescue event
- Hazardous substance
- All greater alarms
- Any call outside the composite stations first pump area in which they are responded to.

It is our recommendation that composite pumps be backed up for all 2 pump calls and all alarm levels without the mandatory minimum 4-minute delay occurring.

FRM Butt's variation:

5) Incident Communications

It is acknowledged that although some policies were not followed this had no detrimental effect on the incident.

5.1 Recommendation

That identification of areas where specialized response is warranted be undertaken within existing response zones to ensure we maintain the appropriate response to all areas of risk.

5.2 Recommendation

That a review of the composite stations backup rules be undertaken to remove the confusion and address the complexities currently experienced by communication centre staff. This review should address the response to:

- Any structure fire
- Rescue event

- Hazardous substance
- All greater alarms
- Any call outside the composite stations first pump area in which they are responded to.

5.3 Recommendation

Our Fire Service policies need to be adhered to by all personnel or amended when necessary. Any issues with policy/procedures need to be communicated through the appropriate channels for assessment or review. It is recommended that comcentre staff be directed to adhere to the mobilizing procedures that are in place.

Members should be aware that the Union has no objection with Regional Management disagreeing with any action plan, but does disagree that anyone other than the originators of the report should have the right to substantially alter the content and meaning of a report.

The three Union members of the review team, John Waldow, Mike McEnaney and Sprats Doughty, were never given the opportunity to comment on or review the amended version of the report. It was simply rewritten by DCFO Gregory on, we suspect, the direct instructions of FRM Butt, and issued as if our members had agreed to the final document, which they had not.

The Auckland Local is also concerned that there is no mention in either the original or the amended reports, of crews of volunteer staff being left without an officer in what could have been a very dangerous position. The officer appeared to be the only member of the responding volunteer crew with pump operator qualifications, as he was in the street carrying out pump operator duties.

Another major concern of the Local is that any reference to the excellent improvisation job the Comcentre staff did on that day has been completely eliminated from the amended report and what amounts to a reprimand, has been inserted.

The Comcen staff who made the decisions to alter the response have the complete backing of the Auckland Local Committee and we hope that they continue to make the kind of decisions they did, so as to ensure the most appropriate response is made to any emergency incident.

The whole amended report, as well as the original draft, will be placed on the NZPFU website in the near future so that any member can read the full extent of the very disturbing manipulation of the facts carried out by the Auckland Region Commander.